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80 - ASEAN Beyond 2015: The Imperatives for Further Institutional Changes
- from SECTION VIII - SOUTHEAST ASIA: PERIPHERAL NO MORE
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- By Rizal Sukma, International Studies in Jakarta
- Edited in consultation with Kee Beng Ooi, Sanchita Basu Das, Terence Chong, Malcolm Cook, Cassey Lee, Michael Chai Ming Yeo
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- Book:
- The 3rd ASEAN Reader
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 22 June 2017
- Print publication:
- 17 August 2015, pp 413-417
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Summary
INTRODUCTION
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), despite its origin as a loose and modest inter-governmental regional organisation aimed at preventing inter-state conflicts through economic and socio-cultural cooperation among its members, has now evolved into an association of sovereign states with a more ambitious agenda of regional integration. Indeed, when ASEAN took a formal decision to transform itself into an ASEAN Community in October 2003, member states declared, “an ASEAN Community shall be established comprising of three pillars, namely political and security cooperation, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural cooperation.”
In 2005, ASEAN leaders agreed on the need for ASEAN to have a charter that would “facilitate community building towards an ASEAN Community and beyond.” Indeed, as it promises to transform ASEAN into a more rules-based organisation rather than a loosely organised association, the ASEAN Charter serves as an important step towards, and a confirmation of ASEAN's commitment to, the realisation of the ASEAN Community.
Since its establishment in August 1967, criticisms of ASEAN have been primarily directed at deficiencies in the organisational structures and the slow pace of institu-tionalisation of the Association.
This paper argues that while ASEAN had in the past undertaken measures to strengthen and expand its institutions, and ASEAN's recent commitment to undertake greater institutionalisation efforts have been manifested in the adoption of the ASEAN Charter, the willingness of member states to rely on regional institutions is still circumscribed by member states’ attachment to the principle of sovereignty and overriding preference for maintaining unity amid regional diversity (as reflected in persistent inter-state problems and diverging interests).
THE EVOLUTION OF ASEAN's INSTITUTIONALISATION: THE PRIMACY OF “ASEAN WAY” AND THE IMPETUS FOR CHANGE
The First Three Decades (1967–1997)
When it was established in August 1967, ASEAN did not set for itself an ambitious task of becoming a regional organisation equipped with complex institutional structures and machinery in order to function effectively and immediately.
Indeed, the necessity to foster regional reconciliation constituted one key reason behind the formation of ASEAN.
Regional reconciliation through regional cooperation required a set of agreed principles, norms and rules that would guide the conduct of foreign relations among participating countries.
5 - Domestic Politics and International Posture: Constraints and Possibilities
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- By Rizal Sukma, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta
- Edited by Anthony J. S. Reid
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- Book:
- Indonesia Rising
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 06 May 2012, pp 77-92
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Summary
There are few countries whose international image has undergone as radical a transformation as Indonesia's within such a short period of time. In the mid-1990s, Indonesia was widely viewed as a major contributor to regional stability in Southeast Asia. Following the political turmoil of 1998–99, however, the country quickly became a source of regional and international concern. Its international image was severely dented by a host of domestic challenges: economic adversity, communal violence, the threat of secession and the growing problem of religious radicalism and terrorism. There were even doubts as to whether Indonesia could survive a democratic transition amidst mounting internal political crises and economic difficulties. By 2004, however, a sense of stability and normalcy had gradually returned, and within a decade of the reintroduction of democracy in 1998, it had become fashionable both within and outside Indonesia to describe the country as a democratic ‘bright spot’ in the developing world.
The changes in Indonesia's international image since Suharto's ascendancy in 1967 – from provider of regional stability to producer of insecurity to consolidating new democracy – have been reflected in differing approaches to foreign policy. As a stable Southeast Asian state for the first three decades, Indonesia was a confident regional player, working to ensure that the maintenance of regional stability would continue to generate prosperity for the region. When domestic order was shattered by dramatic political change in 1998, and national priorities were dictated by the imperative to manage internal political challenges, Indonesia's attention turned inward and it lost its voice in regional, let alone global, affairs. By 2003, however, Indonesia was once again ready to play a more active foreign policy role. It began to take a number of foreign policy initiatives that not only marked the return of a leadership role within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), but also reflected its desire to invoke a new international image as the world's third-largest democracy and largest moderate Muslim-majority country, and as a ‘bridge builder’ and ‘problem solver’ in the wider global community.
12 - Managing Peace in Aceh: The Challenge of Post-Conflict Peace Building
- from Part II - Conflict Resolution
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- By Rizal Sukma, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta
- Edited by Patrick Daly, R. Michael Feener, Anthony J. S. Reid
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- Book:
- From the Ground Up
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 06 February 2012, pp 242-257
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Summary
INTRODUCTION
Unlike the previous two peace attempts, the Helsinki peace accord reached by the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in August 2005 appears to have a better chance of bringing an end to the separatist conflict in the Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD). More than four years after the implementation of the agreement, peace in Aceh was still holding. After the conclusion of peaceful regional elections on 11 December 2006, the overall picture has become even more encouraging. For GAM, its decision in Helsinki to transform itself from an armed insurgency group into a political force within the Republic of Indonesia began to pay off when many former GAM leaders, including the candidate for governor Irwandi Yusuf, won the local elections. For the Government of Indonesia, the fruit of a political settlement to the conflict was evident when Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar officially took the oath as the new governor and vice-governor of NAD Province on 8 February 2007, pledging allegiance to the Republic of Indonesia.
The Aceh peace process represents a remarkable example of a peaceful settlement of internal conflict in a democratizing country. However, because the conflict in Aceh is deep-rooted and multifaceted, factors that could derail the peace process have not disappeared entirely. The key challenge now for the Indonesian Government, the new Aceh government and the Acehnese is how to manage the difficult task of post-conflict peace-building in order to ensure that conflict does not recur in the future. This chapter analyses why the Helsinki peace accord, known as the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), has so far worked well. In addition, the chapter also examines future challenges in post-conflict peace-building efforts. Three issues are critical in this regard: the challenge of governance, the progress of post-tsunami reconstruction and the imperative of a democratic political order in Aceh. Finally, the chapter draws some lessons that might be relevant to the resolution of other conflicts in the region.
3 - Indonesia's 2009 Elections: Defective System, Resilient Democracy
- from Part I - Managing Democracy
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- By Rizal Sukma, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta
- Edited by Edward Aspinall, Marcus Mietzner
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- Book:
- Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 06 April 2010, pp 53-74
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Summary
In 2009, Indonesia held its third set of nationwide democratic elections since the end of Suharto' authoritarian New Order regime in 1998. Surprising many observers, the elections were marred by far worse administrative and technical defects than any previous post-Suharto election, pointing to significant underlying problems in Indonesian democracy. At the same time, the elections were generally agreed to be free and fair, they produced renewed democratic legitimacy for government institutions, and they confirmed or modified, rather than overturned, most of the broad patterns of political alignment established over the preceding decade. Overall, the elections thus point to a high degree of stability and resilience in Indonesia' new democracy, despite the problems.
The elections were held in two rounds. On 9 April 2009 legislative elections determined the membership of national and regional parliaments. The results confirmed a slow but steady change in Indonesia' electoral politics, with some parties gaining significantly in support and others declining, but with the overall pattern of a fragmented multi-party system remaining intact. On 8 July 2009, the first round of direct presidential elections was held, the second such elections since Suharto' fall in 1998. A second-round presidential election, planned for September, proved unnecessary because of a landslide victory by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in the first round, in which he won 60.8 per cent of the vote.
The magnitude of this victory points to relatively high popular satisfaction with government, more than 10 years into Indonesia' democratic transition. Yet the achievements of these elections in consolidating Indonesian democracy were significantly undermined by serious technical flaws that marked a worrying decline in the professionalism of Indonesia' electoral management, and which may be viewed as emblematic of wider problems of governance that still bedevil Indonesian democracy.
This chapter examines key developments related to the election cycle of 2009 and their implications for Indonesian democracy. It is divided into five sections. The first discusses the legislative elections, which continued a slow but important change in Indonesia' electoral politics. The second section analyses the July presidential election, which favoured the candidate best able to navigate a political battleground characterised by the overriding importance of personality and image. The third looks at the influence of political Islam, whose relatively poor performance in 2009 confirms Islam' struggle to remain relevant in a formal political life dominated by non-theocratic forces.
4 - Political Development: A Democracy Agenda for ASEAN?
- from ISSUES
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- By Rizal Sukma, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia
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- Book:
- Hard Choices
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 30 December 2008, pp 135-150
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Summary
Four decades since it was established in August 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) continues to draw both criticism and admiration. In the eyes of its harshest detractors, ASEAN is a futile venture in useless regionalism. To many of its supporters, the Association is the most successful instance of regional cooperation outside the European Union (EU). In between these judgments, numerous analysts have acknowledged ASEAN's shortcomings while also noting its strengths. In the aftermath of the 1997 economic crisis that swept parts of Southeast Asia, however, the balance tipped toward more and more vigorous criticisms. Critiques intensified even within the Association. Participants and observers alike began calling for ASEAN to strengthen its relevance by revitalizing or even reinventing itself.
The most important innovations that ASEAN has undertaken in response to such calls for change have been an ASEAN Security Community (ASC) and an ASEAN Charter. These projects have evolved at the intersection of all three of the themes of this book: security, democracy, and regionalism. Whether the ASC should include democracy alongside security as a main regional principle or goal has been a key topic for discussion ever since the idea of such a Community was first approved in October 2003. Applied to ASEAN as a whole, the same themes have animated debate in preparations for the Charter, since the organization first decided, in December 2005, that it needed to have one.
In view of ASEAN's aversion to taking stands that might imply passing judgment on the domestic political systems and practices of its member states, it is remarkable that the ASC Plan of Action includes and even emphasizes the promotion of democracy as a legitimate goal of the Association. The Charter also makes a reference to the need for ASEAN member states to adhere to democracy and to promote and protect human rights. This development raises important questions about the relationship between democracy and security in Southeast Asia. Can ASEAN promote democracy in the region? Even if it can, should it? And how would the promotion of democracy affect security in Southeast Asia? Would regional security be enhanced? Or would it be undermined?
5 - The ASEAN Charter: Neither Bold Nor Visionary
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- By Rizal Sukma, Muhammadiyah University
- Edited by Pavin Chachavalpongpun
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- Book:
- The Road to Ratification and Implementation of the ASEAN Charter
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 10 December 2008, pp 44-59
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Summary
INTRODUCTION
When the leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the Thirteenth ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005 agreed to start the process of drafting an ASEAN Charter, many welcome the decision as a significant landmark for progress. The decision was applauded with great enthusiasm both within and without the region, including by elements of civil society. The proposed process was really encouraging. It started with the decision by ASEAN leaders to establish the Eminent Persons Group (EPG), which was tasked to provide inputs for the drafting of the Charter. More importantly, the EPG was asked to be “bold and visionary” in its recommendations. Indeed, the outcome of the EPG's deliberation, in the form of recommendations it provided, has been generally acknowledged as a breakthrough that would really open a new chapter for ASEAN. Anyone familiar with ASEAN's conservatism would know that the EPG Report is indeed bold and visionary. Therefore, the expectation was high that if the EPG's recommendations were taken up by the ASEAN governments, then ASEAN would indeed have a very strong and promising legal-constitutional basis.
After the Charter was signed and unveiled at the Thirteenth ASEAN Summit in Singapore in November 2007, however, the high expectations were not entirely met. The Charter is a much watered-down version of the EPG Report. Members of civil society and academics, especially in democratic countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines, immediately criticized and expressed their disappointment at the Charter and called for either the delay in its ratification or outright rejection. Others quickly defended the Charter as an important achievement that needs to be ratified soon. Until today, those who call for nonratification seem to be on the defensive. Six member states — starting with Singapore — already ratified the Charter without any problem. The remaining four — Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Myanmar — have not yet ratified the Charter, albeit for different reasons.
6 - The War on Terror: The Primacy of National Response
- from PART II - Security Aspects
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- By Rizal Sukma, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta
- Edited by John Monfries
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- Book:
- Different Societies, Shared Futures
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 17 May 2006, pp 54-66
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Summary
Until the late 1980s, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was often described as a success in managing regional security. However, this positive image changed quickly with the end of the Cold War, and ASEAN was soon seen as a regional organisation in need of new meaning and relevance. Talk about the declining role of ASEAN – in terms of both intramural cooperation and extra-mural relations – began to grow stronger and louder after the region was swept by financial crisis in 1997. With the world now confronting the challenge of overcoming terrorism, ASEAN is under even greater pressure to prove itself as an organisation worthy of existence, and still relevant.
As a regional organisation in a part of the world that has been dubbed the ‘second front’ in the war against terror, ASEAN is understandably expected to play an important and active role in combating terrorism. However, it is precisely on this front that current criticisms of ASEAN have been directed. It has been asserted, for example, that ‘the ASEAN approach against international terrorism might be viewed as slow, incremental, and turgid particularly in addressing and containing the growth of Islamic extremism in the region’ (de Castro 2004: 208). It has been stated also that ‘ASEAN as an organization has done relatively little to coordinate the substantial counterterrorism efforts of its member states’ (Dillon and Pasicolan 2002: 1) And ‘even after the bombing of the Sari Club in Bali in October 2002, there was little substantial counterterrorism cooperation among the ASEAN states’ (Chow 2005: 302). In short, criticism of ASEAN since 11 September 2001 has focused on ‘the lack of meaningful and substantial cooperation’ in the war against terrorism at the regional level, which ‘would not only strengthen the currently operating terrorist organizations, but also open up the possibility for new organizations to operate from Southeast Asia’ (Swanström 2005: 11).
1 - Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia: Causes and the Quest for Solution
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- By Rizal Sukma, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Jakarta
- Edited by Kusuma Snitwongse
- W. Scott Thompson
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- Book:
- Ethnic Conflicts in Southeast Asia
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 14 October 2005, pp 1-41
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Summary
Introduction
Indonesia's transition towards democracy entered its fourth year in 2002. However, that transition remains difficult, messy, fragile and, above all, painful. The final outcome of the transition process remains uncertain, and the country still risks the return of authoritarianism. Indonesia is still to cope with multiple threats to the fragile democracy. Ongoing inter-religious and inter-ethnic violence, and the threat of ethnic-based armed separatism, constitute such a threat. The very foundation of the Indonesian state — religious and ethnic tolerance — has clearly been shaken when this problem results in thousands of people dying and hundreds of thousands becoming internally displaced. The nature and the magnitude of the problem becomes more complex when the state itself has become part of the problem rather than the solution. Indeed, a society plagued by such religious and ethnic divisions and conflicts serves as the worst enemy, not only to Indonesia's democratic transition and consolidation but also to the very survival of the Indonesian state itself.
It should be noted at the outset that any discussion on the state of ethnic conflicts in post-Suharto Indonesia — regarding their causes, dynamics, and solutions — faces a number of formidable challenges. First, the nature and number of the conflicts, and the magnitude of the problem, make it difficult for any analyst to do justice to them in a short chapter such as this. The country is now faced with at least four major conflicts (Poso, Maluku, Aceh, and Papua) and has experienced several other conflicts that temporarily seem to have subsided (such as ethnic conflicts in West and Central Kalimantan provinces). As the country continues to face inter-religious and inter-ethnic tensions, the potential for future conflicts in other areas cannot be discounted. Second, while some conflicts share common characteristics and patterns, it is also important to recognise that each conflict has its own distinct and unique cause and dynamics, thus demanding different solutions. Third, it is not always easy to characterise what constitutes an ethnic conflict. For example, the conflict in Ambon, Maluku, might have had an ethnic dimension in the beginning of the conflict, but soon turned into interreligious conflict. Similarly, the problems in Aceh and Papua, despite their nature as secessionist conflicts, cannot be properly understood without taking the ethnic dimension into account.
Democratic Governance and Security in Indonesia
- RIZAL SUKMA
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- Journal:
- Japanese Journal of Political Science / Volume 4 / Issue 2 / November 2003
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 14 January 2004, pp. 241-255
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As Indonesia democratises, a key feature of the country's political life has been a mixture of turmoil, hope and uncertainty. When Suharto's authoritarian regime collapsed in May 1998, Indonesia was experiencing the worst political and economic crises in more than three decades. On the political front, Suharto's collapse was preceded by communal violence, political turmoil, and state terrorism. Economically, the financial crisis, which came to Indonesia in December 1997, brought down the foundations of growth and pushed the country on to the brink of economic collapse. All these problems, which found their roots in the absence of democracy and good governance, worsened after the fall of Suharto. As the country moved towards democratic transition, however, society was imbued with a sense of hope for a better future, and that hope continues to exist until today. In that context, resolving current uncertainty constitutes the biggest challenge facing Indonesia in fulfilling the people's hope for a democratic future.
Chapter 8 - Secessionist Challenge in Aceh: Problems and Prospects
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- By Rizal Sukma, Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta
- Edited by Hadi Soesastro, Anthony L. Smith, Mui Ling Han
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- Book:
- Governance in Indonesia
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 26 December 2002, pp 165-181
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Summary
Introduction
Since Indonesia's independence in August 1945, the province of Aceh in northern Sumatra has often been described as a centre of resistance against the central government in Jakarta. Led by an influential ulama (religious leader), Tengku Muhammad Daud Beureueh, Aceh officially launched a rebellion against the central government in 1953. This movement, known as Darul Islam (DI), aimed to create a Negara Islam Indonesia (NII, Islamic State of Indonesia) as part of a wide movement in Indonesia, notably in West Java and South Sulawesi. This clearly demonstrates that Aceh's DI rebellion was never meant to seek a separate independent state outside of Indonesia. Its original goal was only to impose dramatic changes in the nature of the state within the existing state structure, namely the Islamization of the Indonesian state. When the rebellion was finally brought to an end in 1962, it had failed to achieve that goal.
As a result of negotiation between the central government and Aceh rebel forces, the province was, however, given a daerah istimewa (special region) status and promised a broad autonomy in the fields of religion, adat (customary law), and education. It was expected at the time that the compromise would eliminate sources of discontentment within the Acehnese society against the central government in Jakarta. However, this promise was never fulfilled by the central government. Consequently, a subsequent rebellion against Jakarta, which took the form of a secessionist movement, led by Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, Free Aceh Movement), resurfaced in 1976. Since then, Aceh has continued to pose a serious challenge to the territorial integrity of Indonesia during the New Order period and beyond.
Indeed, the protracted conflict in Aceh, which has escalated since the downfall of President Soeharto's New Order government in May 1998, constitutes one of the bloodiest conflicts in contemporary Southeast Asia. Various attempts by the main parties to the conflict — the Indonesian Government and GAM — to seek a peaceful solution through negotiation have not made significant progress. Several agreements to reduce the violent confrontations between the government of Indonesia and GAM failed to achieve results.
Indonesia: A Year of Politics and Sadness
- from INDONESIA
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- By Rizal Sukma, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia
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- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 1998
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 04 August 1998, pp 105-123
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In his presidential address introducing the Draft State Budget (RAPBN) before the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) on 6 January 1997, President Soeharto stated that 1997–98 would be “the years of politics”. Such a characterization was probably due to the fact that during these years Indonesia would face two significant political events, namely, the general election to elect members of the DPR held in May 1997, and the presidential election to be held in March 1998. In this context, the general election was of particular interest to both the government and society. For the former, the general election served as a useful vehicle by which the New Order sought to demonstrate the continued acceptance by society of, at least in the formal sense, its right to rule as a legitimate government. For many in society, the general election brought about an unusual opportunity for them to participate directly in a major national political event.
1997 was also an unfortunate year for Indonesia. In addition to the outbreak of a series of riots from the beginning of the year, it was also marked by a number of “disasters” such as the fiasco over the Busang gold concession, the worst drought in many years, forest fires, and a financial crisis which led to the closing down of sixteen privately owned banks. The Indonesian Government, through Co-ordinating Minister for People's Welfare Azwar Anas, declared on 14 September 1997 that Indonesia was under a state of national disaster. Even though the declaration came as a response to the growing concerns both in Indonesia and in the neighbouring countries, especially Singapore and Malaysia, over forest fires which occurred in many parts of Indonesia, it reflected the general situation in the country. Indeed, at his end-of-year speech, President Soeharto admitted that 1997 was “the year of sadness” for Indonesia.
Both “politics” and “sadness” seemed to have dominated Indonesia's domestic developments in 1997. Many events resulted in a sense of despair, confusion, and uncertainty on the part of the people at large.